SPECIAL ADMISSION OF THE "CULTURALLY
DEPRIVED" TO LAW SCHOOL

Lnvo A. GRArT t
In the past few years many law school faculties have adopted a
policy of granting admissions to a limited number of applicants who do
not meet the school's usual minimum standards. This policy is often
described as applicable to the "culturally deprived," but "cultural
deprivation" is seldom defined and neither a cultural opportunity test
nor an economic status test is employed. The purpose of the policy,
freely recognized within the law schools, is to increase Negro enrollment
and, in some instances and usually to a lesser degree, enrollment of
certain ethnic groups such as Mexican-Americans or Puerto Ricans.
This has been the effect of the policy in operation.' At least one law
school has gone further and directly established racial and ethnic group
quotas.2
The number of applicants admitted to a law school partially on
the basis of racial or ethnic considerations cannot usually be precisely
determined. The admissions committee in most law schools has a
range of discretion; that is, applicants who do not quite meet the
minimum standards for "automatic admission" (nearly always a combination of college grade point average and score on the Law School
Admission Test) may be admitted if their records show some exceptionally favorable factor, such as markedly higher grades in later
college years. Under the new policy, all or nearly all Negro applicants
falling within this range are admitted. These are not usually considered special admissions. Other Negro applicants falling below this
normal range of discretion are also admitted. As to these, the only
minimum objective standard either established or applied may be a
college degree where this is otherwise required. Only this latter group
can be readily identified or recognized as specially admitted, although
all or nearly all Negro applicants may be admitted. Because no
"cultural deprivation" test is in fact employed, Negroes may be specially
admitted even though they are of middle class background, have professional parents, or otherwise appear to have had average or above
average cultural opportunities.

t Rex G. Baker and Edna Heflin Baker Professor in Constitutional Law, University of Texas. B.A. 1952, City College of New York; LL.B. 1954, Columbia
University. Member, District of Columbia and New York Bars.
1 See generally Comment, Current Legal Education of Minorities: A Survey,
19 BUFFALO
L. REv. 639 (1970).
2
Askin, The Case for Compensatory Treatment, 24 RuTiaEs L. REv. 65 (1970)
(editor's headnote).
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Opposition to a policy so obviously well-intentioned and based on
humanitarian considerations is no labor of love. I feel, however, that
the justifications for the policy have not been so much analyzed and
argued as simply asserted or assumed, that the principle involved is
objectionable and the factual premises questionable. Special admission
standards for Negroes will, I fear, disserve the cause of Negro equality,
impair educational quality, and result in deviation of the schools from
their educational function. In any event, because opposing considerations have not been adequately canvassed and weighed, further discussion seems desirable.
The basic principle underlying the new admissions policy is that
because Negroes have been so long and so severely discriminated
against in our society, merely ending this discrimination is not
enough-discrimination in their favor is required.3 That unjust,
societally imposed disadvantages-such as those imposed by reason of
race-should be not only removed but also compensated for is, I believe,
entirely sound. I am disturbed, however, that this should itself be
attempted by means of racial or ethnic discrimination. Discrimination
in favor of some racial or ethnic groups necessarily is or appears to be
discrimination against others. Perhaps discrimination in favor of a
minority can be distinguished from discrimination against a minority,4
but America consists of minorities and I fear the claims that could be
made or conditions justified if this distinction should be generally
accepted. True and complete elimination of racial discrimination is
as close as I had hoped to see the approach of the millenium. Societally
approved racial discrimination, even as a temporary expedient to rectify
past racial discrimination, dilutes the purity of that goal and undermines our most basic ideal that individual merit and individual need
should be the only relevant considerations for societally distributed
rewards and benefits.
Further, discrimination in favor of particular racial or ethnic
groups is largely or entirely unnecessary to achieve true equality in
educational opportunity and is unjust to those who have been denied
such opportunity on other grounds. Severe and unjust as have been
3 See Hughes, Reparation for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1063 (1968) ; Report
of the Committee Set Up to Respond to Proposals Made by the Black American
Law Students Association and the Student Bar Association, May 8, 1968 (New York
University Interdepartmental Communication, Graham Hughes, Chairman) [hereinafter cited as Hughes Report].
[S]ocial justice now requires discrimination in reverse in favor of minority
groups and other disadvantaged groups in the United States. . . . Discrimination is an ugly word and it is only with a shudder that American institutions of education can make a deliberate decision to change their color-blind
policy even for what seem to be the most laudable ends. But the times call
for radical innovations; we must now energetically pursue prosthetic measures.
Id. 7.
4See P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 44-47 (1968).
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the disadvantages of being born black, the overwhelmingly severe and
unjust disadvantage in our society is being born poor. It is severe
because economic advantage tends to bestow all other societal advantages; its effects are unjust because they are societally imposed
without regard to merit. Being poor all your life in America may
somehow be your fault, being born poor is not. With the recent invalidation of governmentally required, approved, or encouraged racial
discrimination, and the growing recognition that all racial discrimination is evil, the disadvantages of being born black and the disadvantages of being born poor increasingly overlap. They can and
should be removed and compensated for together. In education this
can be accomplished by investing whatever resources are necessary
to afford each individual as much education as he can and is willing to
take. In terms of both economics and justice no better investment can
be made-going to the moon is by comparison the building of
pyramids.
My basic objection to the new admissions policy is that, insofar
as it results in the admission of unqualified or unprepared students to
law schools, it is likely to benefit no one and harm many. Whatever
the validity, in general, of the principle that racial discrimination may
be used as a means of compensation for past injustices, it can have no
application to the admission of unqualified students to institutions of
higher education. Inadequate grade school, high school, and college
educational opportunities cannot be redressed by offering quality law
school education. In quality education it is not possible to begin at
the top. Denying admission to qualified students because they were
black was a very great wrong; granting admission to unqualified
students because they are black is not the remedy.
The new admissions policy, I fear, stems from a desire to "do
something," even though all that is within our power to do as members
of law school faculties is unsuitable or even counterproductive as a
means of meeting the problem. Unjust cultural and economic disadvantages should be removed, but we cannot do that. Educational
facilities from nursery school through graduate school should be improved, but we cannot do that. What we can do is ignore the inevitable
effects of these disadvantages and deprivations and admit the deprived
to our law schools. It at least shows where our hearts are.
Proponents of the new policy may answer that urging the removal
of economic impediments to educational opportunity is merely wishing
for utopia and serves no practical purpose in the present context except
to frustrate steps that can be taken. The recent (March 1970) report
of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, however, recommending the removal of all economic barriers to higher education by
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1976, indicates that this utopia may be attainable. In any event, that
the goal may be distant does not justify measures not directed toward
reaching it and costly of other values. Proponents may further argue,
however, that there is value in showing where our hearts are and that
the new policy, however inappropriate or costly, may help create the
political or social climate in which appropriate measures will be taken,
if only to terminate or forestall inappropriate ones. I find more logic
and candor in this argument than in most others offered for the policy,
but I cannot accept it. I think it more likely that such a strategy will,
when discredited, make it more difficult to gain the necessary consensus
for valid solutions to the problems of the poor in general and of Negroes
in particular.
The most specific and frequent argument for the new admissions
policy is simply that there are too few Negro lawyers, that Negroes are
"underrepresented" in the legal profession. As one proponent of the
policy has stated, "All should recognize that the current shortage of
Negro attorneys has reached crisis proportions." I The exact nature
of this "crisis" is not made clear. We would undoubtedly all be
happier if all definable groups were proportionately represented in all
social categories, employment and other-it would be consistent with
democratic ideals. When my child's new teacher turns out to be a
Negro, I am very pleased; it permits me to think that the world, or at
least the country, is on its way to being well. (This pleasure would
not be possible, or would be much diminished, if I had reason to believe
the Negro teacher less qualified than his or her white counterpart.)
It is, however, even more consistent with, indeed required by, the
democratic ideal that people not be classified-and neither taught nor
expected to classify others-on the grounds of race. I do not know
that Negroes do or should prefer that their attorneys be Negroes, or
that Negro attorneys can more effectively represent their interests. To
assume, accept, and even urge, otherwise seems to me to verge upon
racism, to use that most common and forceful of epithets. Achievement
of proportional representation of different groups is not a proper goal
of higher education. It seems a small step from this to the argument
(not unknown in our past) that certain groups are overrepresented in
various professions. Society needs the best lawyers it can get, regardless of racial or ethnic derivation. The need of culturally or economGGellhorn, The Law Schools and the Negro, 1968 DUxE L.J. 1069, 1075 n29;
Report of the Advisory Committee for the Minority Groups Study, in ASSoCiATIOiN
OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS-PROCEEDINGS, pt. 1, § 1, at 160 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as 1967 Minority Groups Study] (output of Negro graduates "painfully inadequate") ;
Hughes Report 5. The Hughes Report argued that New York University Law
School should adopt a special admission program because (1) the rest of the University was doing it, (2) "other leading law schools" were doing it, and (3) to do
otherwise would have been "unfair to the minority group students presently in the
School." Id. 6.
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ically disadvantaged groups is the same: the best representation they
can get. This representation can and does come from all races. Similarly, effective leadership both in democratic ideal and in fact does not
require racial identity of the leader and the group, as Senator Brooke
of Massachusetts demonstrates. Nor are the problems of poverty and
of racial and ethnic discrimination solely or even distinctively matters
of concern for members of minority groups; they are inescapably the
most important problems for us all, and particularly for all lawyers.
Even assuming that particular minority groups have problems
distinct from the general social problems of poverty and discrimination,
it would be unwise and unfair to ask or expect law school graduates
from particular minority groups to confine their practice to the problems of those groups if they are not so inclined. These graduates,
meeting normal standards, will, I believe, have opportunities today
equal to those of other graduates with similar records. The potential
for social service, influence, and leadership exists in Washington, on
Wall Street, and in major corporations as well as in the slums. If law
schools were specifically looking to develop minority group organizers,
they might give preference to militant activists from those groups, as
has been done in some cases. Experience has apparently shown, however, that these often make the least effective and most disruptive
students.
It is further argued that minority group lawyers are important
beyond their individual merits because of their visibility-they are
living evidence that minority group members can advance and participate in all levels of our society. I agree,' but only insofar as the
minority group lawyers are effective, able lawyers, the equals of their
"majority group" peers. The abstract question whether Negroes can
compete and succeed in this country has, I believe, been answered in the
affirmative; there are few positions short of President and Vice President that Negroes have never attained. At the very highest level of the
legal profession, the United States Supreme Court, Negroes are "represented" almost exactly in proportion to their share of the population.'
Ineffective minority group lawyers will disserve the cause of
minority group equality and recognition. In the short run disserving
the interests of their clients, they will in the long run reinforce stereo6 Indeed, I sometimes think the chief disadvantage of being born poor is not

that you are poor but that everyone you know is and has the horizons of the poor.
7 On this basis, certain other minority groups might have reason to complain
about their representation in the governing processes of the United States. For
example, no Italian-American has ever served on the United States Supreme Court
and only one has ever served in the United States Senate. I am not concerned
about an "Italian-American problem," but if racial or ethnic "representation" should
be accepted as legitimate, many can seek such representation to the detriment of all.
Although other claims are not as valid as the Negro's, the departure from principle
is so apparent that strong resentment is inevitable and justification difficult.
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types of incompetence. It will soon come to be believed that to get
a real lawyer he had better be very white.' The point is important on
a much wider scale: one of the most serious disservices done by
lowered academic standards for Negroes in institutions of higher learning is to call into question the legitimacy of every Negro graduate.
Neither individuals nor institutions should become accustomed to believe that Negroes cannot meet usual standards. As the prominent
Negro psychologist Kenneth P. Clark has stated:
Racism emerges in both blatant and in more difficult to
answer, subtle, manifestations. In the academic community,
it began to be clear in the 1960's that apparently sophisticated
and compassionate theories used to explain slow Negro
student performance might themselves be tainted with racist
condescension. Some of the theories of "cultural deprivation," "the disadvantaged," and the like, until recently popular
in educational circles and in high governmental spheres, and
still prevalent in fact, were backed for the most part by inconclusive and fragmentary research and much speculation.
The eagerness with which such theories were greeted was
itself a subtly racist symptom. The theories obscured this
orientation, but when challenged, some of their advocates
posed more overt racist formulations. 9
Apart from the implication of inferiority, consideration and treatment of a student not as an individual but as a representative of his
race necessarily imposes upon him burdens and responsibilities no one
should be expected to bear. As described by a recent Negro law school
graduate:
There were seventeen black students in my law school class,
and we were all scared; perhaps more than the white students.
Traditionally, first-year law students are supposed to be
afraid, or at least awed; but our fear was compounded by the
uncommunicated realization that perhaps we were not authentic law students and the uneasy suspicion that our classmates knew that we were not, and, like certain members of
the faculty, had developed paternalistic attitudes toward us.
The silence, the heavy sense of expectation, fell on all of the
blacks in a classroom whenever one of us was called upon for
an answer. We waited, with the class, for the chosen man to
justify the right of all of us to be there.
8 Thurgood Marshall, in his early days of law practice, "overheard a Baltimore
court clerk . . . speaking contemptuously of a 'nigger brief' filed by a Negro lawyer.
[He] vowed then never to give even the most bigoted judicial functionary cause to
use such an epithet in connection with his own work." MacKenzie, Thurgood
Marshall, in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969,
at 3063, 3070 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969).
9 Clark, The Social Scientists, the Brown Decision, and Contemporary Confusion,
in ARGUMENT xxxi, xli (L. Friedman ed. 1969).
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I cite this not as an example of the black student's inability to compete successfully with his white classmate, but
rather, as an example of the psychological pressures on him
to work even harder than his white classmates and to take
every minor defeat much more seriously than it ought to be
taken; to invest in it certain racial implications. There were
many white students who could not give adequate answers to
questions put to them; but I suspect that none of their white
classmates felt that their own intellectual equipment was
being measured by the performance of these people.' 0
If a student is admitted to a school not as an individual but as a Negro,
he will be judged as a Negro. It is burden enough to be accountable
only for oneself. To insist that each human being be treated as an
individual, even when preferences are intended for people who have
suffered severely because we have not insisted on this in the past, is not
a ruse to avoid appropriate corrective action. Classification by race
is as unwise, even if not as unjust, now as it was then. It may be
difficult or impossible for some to consider a man's race irrelevant to
his individual humanity, but our best hope for racial justice and respect
lies, I believe, in making the attempt.
At the beginning of the movement for special admission programs-and usually today when such a program is first proposed for
a school-it was generally insisted that only admission standards
should be lowered and that performance standards in the schools should
be maintained. Proponents were emphatic that "[i]t is to be hoped
that law schools never compromise their standards of performance for
Negro youth, particularly during the last year or two of enrollment.
Whatever their needs, this is not one of them." " An Association of
American Law Schools committee on the question stated, "[w]e support adherence to a single standard of performance in the law school
and of admission to the profession." 12 By selectively and sufficiently
lowering admission standards, "representation" of various groups in
the student body can be achieved in any proportion desired. The difficulty, of course, is that students not meeting a school's minimum admission standards cannot reasonably be expected to meet its performance standards. The major factual premise (or hope) of proponents
of special admissions is or was that the "culturally deprived" are more
likely than others to perform in law school beyond the level indicated
by their objective academic achievements and test scores. I find this
premise intrinsically implausible and have seen no persuasive evidence
10 MfcPherson, The Black Law Student: A Problem of Fidelities, ATLANTIC,
Apr. 1970, at 99.
11 Carl & Callahan, Negroes and the Law, 17 J. LEGAL EI. 250, 263 (1965).
121967 Minority Groups Study pt. 1, § 1, at 163.
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enhancing its plausibility. It seems to me an instance, not uncommon
in this area, of the wish fathering the thought.
The objective admission criteria for nearly all law schools are
performance on the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) and college
grades. The LSAT strives to measure-apparently with a high degree
of success-skills essential for law study, such as reading, writing, and
abstract analysis. (A portion of the LSAT dealing with factual information has been found to be of little value in predicting success in
law school and has been dropped by many schools.)
If "cultural
deprivation" means lack of exposure to and experience with difficult
written material and abstract reasoning, it will undoubtedly adversely
affect performance on the LSAT and in college. There is no reason,
however, to think that it will adversely affect performance in law school
any less. The effects of "cultural deprivation" will, if anything,
accumulate and become more disadvantageous as the student reaches
higher educational levels. It is difficult to accept that "cultural deprivation" results not in deficiency in essential law school skills but merely
in ability to demonstrate them and that they are likely to appear for
the first time in law school. Although a difference in motivation can
make a difference in performance despite objective criteria, I know
of no way to measure motivation other than performance and have no
reason to believe that the "culturally deprived" are more highly
motivated than others to succeed academically. Unusual motivation
may help overcome obstacles to acquiring basic academic skills, but
it is probably unwise to attempt law school without such skills.
The limited data available do not indicate that the "culturally deprived" perform in law school beyond what is indicated by objective
standards. As the American Association of Law Schools committee,
referred to above, stated:
There has been no end of discussion in the law school
world as to the relative reliability of the Law School Admission Test for the culturally deprived. A study has been
made by a committee of the Law School Admission Test
Council of the relation of Law School Admission Test performance to law school performance by the culturally deprived (of whatever race).
It extended to some 8,000
persons who had attended sixteen law schools. The upshot
was that the committee found nothing statistically to support
the conclusion that the Law School Admission Test relationship was significantly different for the culturally deprived than
for the rest. There were too few Negroes in the group to
provide a basis for a statistical conclusion as to them.' 3
13 1d. 166.

The study referred to is THE INTERPRETATION OF LAW SCHOOL
DEPavED AND NON-WHITE CANDIDATES,

ADMISSION TEST SCORES FOR CULTURALLY
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Some data may indicate that the "culturally deprived" perform below
expectations.' 4 As one strong proponent of special admissions has
stated:
While schools are reluctant to disclose specific figures,
most major law schools which have enrolled substantial numbers of Negroes acknowledge that most Negro students, in
general, have performed below the expectations suggested by
their grade and test records.-"
Nonetheless, one hears reports that special admissions programs
are a "success" because many of the specially admitted have graduated
or are passing their courses. 6 Concrete data are difficult to obtain,'7
but I find the available information, like my limited personal experience,
not encouraging. The reports from the various schools are difficult to
evaluate for several reasons. Some schools have in fact abandoned the
factual premise on which the programs were originally based and no
longer insist on undiluted performance standards-lowered standards
are now justifiable.'" At New York University Law School, for
example, a special admissions program was first adopted in 1966 when
the school employed an anonymous grading procedure under which the
identity of the student was not known to the professor until after the
grade was assigned. After two years, twelve of fifteen specially admitted students were not maintaining a passing average. A faculty
committee reporting on the problem found that the special admissions
program was being "crippled by the rigidity of the anonymous grading
system" and that "[t]he preservation inviolate of traditionally narrow
canons of academic excellence recedes into insignificance when confronted with the dimensions of the American crisis of social inSee also LAW
SCHOOL ADmissioN TEST 1968 ANNUAL CouNciL REPORT 140; Comment, supra note
1, at 645.
14 Pitcher & Schrader, A Note on Professor Flickinger's "Law School Admissions
and the Culturally Deprived," in LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST 1968 ANNUAL
CouNciL REPORT 165.
156 Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1089.
' See, e.g., Emory University School of Law Report to the Field Foundation,

LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST 1965-66 ANNUAL CouNciL REPORT 81.

1966-67 Pre-Start Program for Prospective Negro Law Students, Oct. 1967, copy

on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
17 Comment, sipra note 1, at 645: "Conceding the limitations of the survey, one
might nevertheless become bothered by the suspicion that perhaps the reason so many
schools failed to reply to the question [of the performance of the specially admitted]
is a reluctance to discuss the problem."
is "There is a self-defeating, perverse and almost cynical aspect to admitting
students who are below our usual standards and then expecting them immediately to
meet standards of performance which have been evolved as being suitable for those
who do meet normal admission standards." Hughes Report 11; accord, Gellhorn,
supra note 5, at 1091: "[If the double standard is only a law school's recognition
that its normal standards are unnecessarily high, then the second standard utilizing
competency rather than excellence as the test of graduation seems temporarily
acceptable,"
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justice." "9 It successfully recommended that the grading system be
changed to permit a professor to take into account special admission
when a student would otherwise receive a failing grade.2 ° The view
that special admissions programs, once adopted, should not be permitted
to "fail" arises naturally. Some schools have admittedly adopted a
"double standard" for performance and the practice is probably widespread; 21 at least one school has simply lowered its standards for all
students. ' Apart from school policy, many individual faculty members have undoubtedly found the temptation for special standards or
generally lowered standards irresistible.
Comparison of the performance of the specially admitted with
other students is also difficult because most schools with a special admissions program provide additional tutorial assistance, lighter course
loads, and other advantages to specially admitted students. This approach sensibly recognizes that deficiencies in fact exist and attempts
to remedy them. Unfortunately, the specially admitted often reject
23
such recognition and such programs have generally been unsuccessful.
A further consideration in evaluating reports on special admissions
is that the programs are often administered by the faculty member or
members most committed to them. Reports from these faculty members sometimes differ widely from reports of other faculty members.
In this area, public and official discussions are typically favorable or
optimistic, while private discussions are despairing.
Special admission programs, almost by definition, operate to insure
that students are placed in schools for which they are not qualified. As
a result, many students fully qualified for other schools, attend institutions for which they are ill-equipped. Law schools with the otherwise
most exacting requirements recruit and accept students some of whom
could in fact meet the requirements of average schools; average schools
accept students who are qualified for our least demanding schools;
and our least demanding schools accept students who would better
serve themselves, their racial or ethnic group, and society in some
capacity other than as lawyers. Frustration and humiliation are
virtually insured.
Special admission programs must be evaluated in a wider context
than whether specially admitted students are somehow graduating from
law school. Apart from the general debasement of academic standards
19Hughes Report 12-13.
2Id. 14.
21 Comment, supra note 1, at 645; Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1091.
22 Comment, supra note 1, at 646.
2 3

LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST 1969 ANNUAL COUNCIL. REPORT 155 ("any major
attempt to provide special tutorial programs proved highly unsatisfactory") ; Gellhorn,
supra note 5, at 1090.
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to which these programs irresistibly lead, the experience of many
schools, as related to me by individual faculty members and corroborated in part by reports in the press, should be cause for deep
concern. These reports seem to confirm that the "culturally deprived"
have no advantage in overcoming deficiencies in basic academic qualifications, and that to admit to law school applicants not meeting the
school's minimum academic requirements while asking them to try to
meet as students the academic standards of the school is to invite
frustration and failure. This does not benefit the student, and the resentment which results can greatly harm the school. Institutions of
higher education, we have seen too frequently, are delicate and vulnerable; they are not designed to resist the concerted effects of resentment-and I hope they never will be so designed.
What are law schools to do when faced with the effects of the
resentment and frustration engendered by admission of the unqualified,
and with the inevitable demands for further abandonment of academic
standards and goals? The response of many proponents of special
admissions is not encouraging. Typically, they deny that any demand
is intended to be unreasonable and urge that even admittedly outrageous demands be treated as pathetic, inarticulate pleas capable of
mollification and appeasement. This approach, consistent with the
principles of special admissions, seems to me condescending and unrealistic. It refuses to recognize that others can mean what they say
and have the capacity to say what they mean. Spokesmen for groups
making demnands on our universities should be recognized as literate,
articulate, and intelligent human beings, not patronized as incompetents.
Outrageous demands cannot, merely because they are such and often
carry implied or explicit threats of violence, be treated as innocuous or
inept misstatements of reasonable complaints. Intimidation and extortion are not inconceivable; they are all too real and immediate in
our universities today.
More importantly, having accepted a policy of special admissions
on racial and ethnic grounds, what is an outrageous or improper demand? If the "underrepresentation" of certain groups is to be remedied
by lowered admission standards, why not directly and completely, as
is increasingly being done, by racial and ethnic quotas? If justice requires lowered standards for some members of these groups, should
they not be lowered for all? Anything less can be and has been rightly
denounced as tokenism. If lowered admission standards are appropriate, is the inevitable demand for lowered performance standards
improper? If certain courses are not suited to this approach they can
be made optional, changed, or eliminated. If some instructors might
not be cooperative, students can be given control of their selection or
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assignment. Argument by parade of horribles is not the most persuasive, but the true horrible here, I believe, is that each of these
proposals is being seriously urged today and some have been adopted. 2,
After only a few years in the academic world following several
as a practicing lawyer in the business world, I find myself often tempted
to the view that among many academics the instinct to self and institutional preservation is unusually weak. Many seem so fundamentally
dissatisfied with our society, including academic institutions, that they
welcome or refuse to resist a radical restructuring. The reason may
stem partly from the nature of the academic function, a most important
part of which, at least in law school, is to examine critically all aspects
of our society. Our proper function is to discern and point out wherein
our society falls short of the ideal, as indeed it often does; we properly
measure America against heaven. We serve America best by not
leaving it to its lovers. Lovers are not noted for objectivity or
rationality; they lack motive to seek improvement, without which there
is decay. For this reason, among others, independent and effective
academic institutions must be preserved. But virtues unrestrained become defects: in performance of our duty to compare America to
heaven we can neglect to remember that it exists on earth, which, more
often than not, has been hell. We can become so impassioned for the
ideal-and to exorcise long established evils usually requires passionthat we jeopardize progress towards the ideal we have made. In the
context of inhumanity and misery I read as history, I hold the American
achievement high. This is not to fail to see that America has not been
as good to some as to others or to deny that it must be improved.
It is only to recognize that our society and our academic institutions
have much to lose. I am grateful to those who work for a better
society, but I will not be easily convinced that it will be brought about
by the destruction or radical disruption of this one. It is far more
likely that the remarkable degree of freedom and the hope for justice
we possess will be diminished. Compassionate recognition of conditions that have existed in our society helps us to understand the impulse
for radical change and some of the violence and disruption in our
schools, but it does not lessen our responsibility to preserve what is
24 Askin, supra note 2, at 65 (editor's headnote) : "Rutgers Law School is one
of an increasing number of educational institutions which has taken affirmative action
to eliminate racial imbalance among its student body by establishing a minimum
quota for black and other minority students."
Professor Gellhorn states that the challenge for law schools today in examining
the "cultural bias, if any . . . in the law schools" is to "honestly examine and
evaluate the fairness and utility of current practices, and, where necessary, adapt
their methods to meet the needs of Negro students to provide them with adequate
legal training while at the same time not destroying the quality education now
made available to the student body as a whole." Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1089.
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worth preserving. Shame for the past and overflowing good intentions
must not be allowed to displace reason or hamper our ability to appraise
the consequences of what we do or permit.
As a final word, perhaps one who argues as I have must go beyond
pro forma concession of past injustices. Our grounds for guilt in
racial matters are great indeed; the reservoir of shame will be a long
time emptying. A nation which has forced or permitted others to force
a whole group of people to the back of the bus has much to repent.
And it is no good to argue that the back of the bus is better than
walking. To walk when others walk is no shame; to be permitted only
the back of the most luxurious bus is degradation. Gratuitous destruction of self-respect is the ultimate inhumanity. Had I been kept
at the back of the bus, it would not be wise, I hope, to place me unprepared in a fragile center of learning. Our society has paid, is paying, and will continue to pay for these injustices. They must be
rectified by every rational means-not to expiate the sins of the past,
but to make the present and future more tolerable, and to make irrational expedients to satisfy desperate needs resistible.

